Over the Human Post humanism and the Concept of Animal Epiphany

by Roberto Marchesini

Over the Human Post humanism and the Concept of Animal Epiphany This book presents a new way to understand human animal interactions Offering a profound discussion of topics such as human identity our relationship with animals and the environment and our culture the author channels the vibrant Italian traditions of humanism materialism and speculative philosophy The research presents a dialogue between the humanities and the natural sciences It challenges the separation and oppression of animals with a post humanism steeped in the traditions of the It

Publisher : Springer

Author : Roberto Marchesini

ISBN : 9783319625805

Year : 2017

Language: en

File Size : 1.28 MB

Category : Politics Social Sciences

Numanities - Arts and Humanities in Progress 4

Roberto Marchesini

Over the Human
Post-humanism and the Concept
of Animal Epiphany

Numanities - Arts and Humanities in Progress
Volume 4

Series editor
Dario Martinelli, Kaunas, Lithuania

The series originates from the need to create a more proactive platform in the form
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“Numanities” (New Humanities) aim to unify the various approaches and
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Roberto Marchesini

Over the Human
Post-humanism and the Concept of Animal
Epiphany

123

Roberto Marchesini
Study Centre of Posthuman Philosophy
Bologna
Italy
Translated by Sarah De Sanctis

ISSN 2510-442X
ISSN 2510-4438 (electronic)
Numanities - Arts and Humanities in Progress
ISBN 978-3-319-62580-5
ISBN 978-3-319-62581-2 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-62581-2
Library of Congress Control Number: 2017946921
© Springer International Publishing AG 2017
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Contents

1 The Epimethan Condition. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1.1 The Evanescence of Animality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1.2 From Epimethean Predication to the Promethean
Meta-Predicate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1.3 Epimetheus’ Forgetfulness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1.4 The Animal Mirror as Anti-narcissus . . . . . . . . . .

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2 The Promethean Condition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.1 A Second Nature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.2 The Sharp Separation Between Human and Non-human
Animals in Philosophical Anthropology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.3 Is the Human Condition Original or Produced? . . . . . . . . . . .

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5 Zoomimesis: Embodied Epiphany . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5.1 Recognizing Oneself in Otherness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5.2 Inspiration and Revelation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5.3 The Theriomorphic Sublime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5.4 The Relationship Between Zoomimesis and Techne . . .

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Therianthropic Being as Our Neighbour . .
In Search of the Animal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Umwelt as the Animal Prison . . . . . . . .
Animal Appeal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4 Overcoming the Human . . . . . . . . . . .
4.1 Ontopoiesis: Open Identity . . . . . .
4.2 Identity as Hybridization . . . . . . .
4.3 Hybridization, or Falling in Love .

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Contents

6 Steps Towards a Philosophical Ethology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
6.1 Shifting from an “Automatism-Based Model”
to an “Instrument-Based Model” in Order to Explain
the Endowments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
6.2 Subjectivity as Presence and Systemic Emergence Compared
to the Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
6.3 Psychic Emergence and Positional-Relational State
of the Body . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
6.4 Subjectivity Means Existential Plurality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
6.5 The Emancipation of Animality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
7 The
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Posthuman Dimension . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Premise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Post-humanism Versus Trans-humanism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
A New Culture for Techne . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
What Are the Ontological Differences Between the Vitruvian
Model and the Cyborg? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Glossary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157

Chapter 1

The Epimethan Condition

Do animals exist? Or are they only a construction, a polarizing mirror that highlights the excellence and special nature of human beings—as if they were animals
purified from every contamination? This question has been asked many times in the
past decades and remains unanswerable if we are stuck in the humanist dichotomy
treating man and the animal as mutually exclusive. In this perspective, in order to
configure the image of the human it is necessary to oppose it to a background,
not confusing it in the zoological magma nor letting it be swallowed by the
predicative multi-shapedness of biodiversity. The humanistic imperative is therefore not to turn human peculiarity into a predicate—the human as bearer of a certain
specialization—as this would nullify what is proper of human beings, blending it
into the mare magnum of biodiversity. Beings belonging to other species, with their
plural characterization, are nullified in the term “animal” if the latter, far from
signifying the condition of “animal-being” including humans, is used as opposed to
the human.1
In this logic there is no more space for the multi-shapedness of the animal
condition, where the predicate of biodiversity is essential to its foundation, but there
is a homologating categorization that proceeds negatively, in terms of what is
lacked, so that the animal is a being lacking something compared to the human. To
support the anthropocentric project, in fact, it is indispensable that there is a gap
between the human and all other animals: it is not sufficient to declare the former’s

1

J. Derrida, The Animal That Therefore I Am in Critical Inquiry, Vol. 28, No. 2. (Winter, 2002),
pp. 369–418. Derrida writes “‘the Animal,’ as if all nonhuman living things could be grouped
without the common sense of this “commonplace,” the Animal, whatever the abyssal differences
and structural limits that separate, in the very essence of their being, all “animals,” a name that we
would therefore be advised, to begin with, to keep within quotation marks. Confined within this
catch-all concept, within this vast encampment of the animal, in this general singular, within the
strict enclosure of this definite article (“the Animal” and not “animals”), as in a virgin forest, a zoo,
a hunting or fishing ground, a paddock or an abattoir, a space of domestication, are all the living
things that man does not recognize as his fellows, his neighbors, or his brothers” p. 402.
© Springer International Publishing AG 2017
R. Marchesini, Over the Human, Numanities - Arts and Humanities
in Progress 4, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-62581-2_1

1

2

1 The Epimethan Condition

specificity. This way the non-human becomes a solid and consistent category: all
animals are lacking whatever makes the human a non-animal. This nullifies:
(a) on the one hand, the common animal-being inclusive of the species Homo
sapiens, so that the human finds itself belonging to a different realm, which
requires disciplines and approaches opposed to natural sciences;
(b) on the other hand, heterospecificity2 as such, as belonging to a peculiar domain
(the species) irreducible to whatever claim of functionality opposed to the
human.
To rediscover animals and “the animal that therefore I am”3 it is thus necessary
to go beyond mere description, because any description of the animal is the outcome of prejudice, to put it with Gadamer.4 Before looking at heterospecificity as
the very condition of animal-being, it is indispensable to understand the mechanisms that have led to the emergence of the “animal” category/dimension as
counter-term of the human condition. It’s not an easy task, not only due to cultural
frameworks—in primis, as we shall see, that of humanism—that have grounded
their ideology on this antinomy, but also due to the very mechanism of the
encounter with otherness. In other words, there is an intrinsic difficulty in recognizing the other species, which I define “animal epiphany.” The encounter with the
non-human animal is hardly contained within the phenomenic area, which would
entail remaining in that limbo of objective recognizability made possible by
Heidegger’s distancing process.
It is certainly true that, to pass from perceiving-using to the neutral
perceiving-evaluating that recognises being in itself, it is necessary to take a distance. However, it is equally true that when intersubjectivity occurs—seeing oneself
in the face of the other, as suggested by Lévinas5—the other loses its characters of
objective extraneity and becomes a for-itself, inaugurating a perceiving-mirroring.
In other words, we are faced with a process of decentralization (one that takes
distance from being as usable but also from the subject evaluating the in-itself) that
goes beyond the objectification of the being. When seeing herself in the face of the

By “heterospecificity” I mean the characteristic of belonging to a species other than the human.
See glossary.
3
Ibid.
4
H.G. Gadamer, “The Problem of Historical Consciousness” in Graduate Faculty Philosophy
Journal, Volume 5, Issue 1, Fall 1975.
Special H.G. Gadamer Issue, pp. 8–52, Here Gadamer states: “To denounce something as
prejudice is to suspend its presumed validity; in fact a prejudice in the strict sense of that term
cannot get hold of us unless we are sufficiently unconscious of it” p. 48.
5
E. Lévinas, Totality and Infinity. An Essay on Exteriority. Duquesne University Press, Pittsburgh,
Pennsylvania, 2011. That is an otherness that acts as a mirror. For Lévinas, we must respect the
Other not because we come into contact with it in many different contexts, but because we attribute
a meaning to it or, better, as the philosopher writes: “The face speaks. The manifestation of the
face is already discourse,” p. 66.
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1 The Epimethan Condition

3

non-human animal, as a reflective mirror of the self, the human is absorbed in the
other-by-species and recognizes herself in the amazement at being beyond the
givenness of her body.
In the face of otherness the human being designs herself from the point of view
of identity by means of the spurious image reflected by the other. This is why I
speak of “epiphany”6: an annunciation, an appearance of the phenomenon in itself,
an alternative path to being blindly focused on oneself. As we will see, in the
encounter with the non-human animal, there are simultaneously:
(a) a process of identification. It lies in granting the other individuality—no longer
a cat, but that cat—or a being-in-the-world that transcends membership and
brings the relation to it to the intersubjective dimension (I look at you, you look
at me) founded on a common basis, i.e. characters that we share. It also lies in
being both included in an individual moment of encounter, in a one to one
relationship7;
(b) a process of distancing. It lies in granting the other its own being—cat-being—
which means seeing the world through a different perspective, being amazed at
diversity, challenging any narcissistic projection and pushes expressive categories, forcing them to take an alternative route. This, however, does not distance the human from the animal, but the human from itself, capturing it even
more deeply and de-centering it.
It is in this double movement, characterized by recognition and disavowal, that
epiphany occurs, and the result is anything but neutral, because in return the human
being finds itself changed, infected by animal otherness. Only then will the
non-human animal become an otherness, only when it is recognized as similar and
engaging as well as different. The dialogue to which the encounter with the
non-human animal forces us leaves no room for separation: it is the feeling of the
understanding and dialectical gaze of the other, capable of bringing out the
non-obvious datum of a condition not previously assumed. When the non-human
animal stops being a phenomenon, the moment when the human being recognizes
itself/the non-human animal, immediately there is a kind of partnership between the
animal otherness and the human being reflected in it, creating in a hybrid image that
in itself is already able to indicate a path of transformation of the human.

By “epiphany” I mean the human projection into otherness. See glossary.
Jacques Derrida, when discussing this character of “individuality,” writes: “It is true that I identify
it as a male or female cat. But even before that identification, I see it as this irreplaceable living
being that one day enters my space […]. Nothing can ever take away from me the certainty that
what we have here is […] a mortal existence, for from the moment that it has a name, its name
survives it. It signs its potential disappearance. Mine also, and this disappearance, from that
moment to this, fortlda, is announced each time that […] one of us leaves the room.” Derrida, The
Animal That Therefore I Am, p. 379.

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1.1

1 The Epimethan Condition

The Evanescence of Animality

Before analyzing the characteristics of this encounter, as I am speaking to a reader
who comes from a specific cultural tradition, I think it is a necessary to look at the
hermeneutical frames that make the meeting with the non-human animal difficult, or
often impossible, within the humanistic paradigm. The non-human has been
reduced in terms of “undifferentiated-animal”—a material easily converted in many
different processes, such as:
(a) the transformation into figure, to define an opposition, an emancipation, a
regression, a revelation, a stigma;
(b) the reduction to concept, movable and usable outside of a specific and concrete
reference to the animal as other-by-species compared to the human being;
(c) the metamorphosis of the animal into a picture, called to represent concepts or
entities that are otherwise difficult to configure metaphorically, metonymically,
symbolically, allegorically, as double or iconic projection;
(d) the construction of transitional or subrogative entities like the anthropomorphic
pet, the animal slave, the mechanical or experimental model, the reified and
commodified animal.
In its lack of specificity, of its own inalienable quid, the undifferentiated-animal
is unable to show anything to the human being, neither in phenomenal terms nor,
even less so, in epiphanic ones. When I talk about animal epiphany, in fact, I do not
mean a nullification of the phenomenal meaning of the non-human—the reduction
following the alienation of the specificity—but an overload in terms of deviation
from the expectations and projective reductions. The phenomenon, i.e. the sharpness of the predicative specificity, must not in any way be impeded but, on the
contrary, it should be emphasized to produce the epiphany. Only an accentuation of
the non-human animal’s essence is able to have a morphopoietic8 effect on my body
in the hybridational sense, because it is capable of projecting on my human body its
heteromorphia.9 Let me make an example: the epiphanic encounter with an eagle
can only be realized as long as it is not transformed into an undifferentiated being
(lacking a specific being-in-the-world) approximate to me—this is anthropomorphism—i.e. into the lowest common denominator between the two of us, which
would inevitably annihilate the differences. The epiphany can emerge only if you
determine the recognition of a common root that does not impede but, for this very
reason, emphasizes the differences to the point of absorbing me in a birdlike perspective that is viable from an anthropopoietic perspective. Thus the perspective of
“you can fly” opens up before me.
This is why the contemporary tendency to anthropomorphize animals greatly
reduces the epiphanic potential of the encounter: many people live with a dog or a
cat but very few are “dogmorphised” or “catmorphised”, transforming their
For “morphopoietic” see glossary.
For “heteromorphia” see glossary.

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1.1 The Evanescence of Animality

5

experience into an opportunity of development. To do that it would be necessary to
maintain and, I would say, especially value the predicate of species-specific
diversity, bringing to the surface and magnifying the features that characterize the
peculiarities within the common animal condition. Each species has a precise
adaptive characterization, some variation of the condition of animal-being in a
given context (the savannah or the forest, the gloomy underground or the bright
meadow, symbiosis or autonomy) and in a given style (herbivore or carnivore,
sedentary or migratory, daily or nightly). These characteristics are both:
(a) a way of reconstructing reality through the act of perception;
(b) a set of coordinates of reference-fruition of the world on the basis of precise
operational schemes—as suggested by von Uexküll with the concept of
Umwelt.10
The plurality of predicates characterizing biodiversity allows for no type of
categorization except the omnicomprehensive one of animal-being. In other words,
each species is different, unique and superior to all the others for a certain predicate;
you could build a pyramid placing it at the top only choosing its excellence as a
touchstone. The predicates with which the species declines its performative adaptation are in fact silent in terms of oppositional categorization: they do not allow
one to create a category that includes all non-human species in opposition to
another category that characterizes the human being. Therefore, if we refer to the
predicates expressing the particular specialization of each animal, we cannot build
an oppositional dichotomy between humans and other species. To create a gap
between the living, it is essential to treat predicates like appearance and irrelevance
in the definition of the condition itself. In other words, be it a swallow circling in
the sky or a dolphin pirouetting in the water, a mole underground or a monkey on a
branch, the condition of those living beings does not change. In fact, it is not the
diversity/specificity of their predicates that defines their being in the world, but the
rootedness that these predicates produce, in their total performative adequacy,
denying freedom to the non-human.
The predicates are appearance and the humanist philosopher must be able to see
in the socket, in the wings, in the fins nothing but chains that prevent the
non-human from any real presence in the world. But, of course, the non-human
animal can resist as an entity only by defending the specialty of its predicates,
avoiding the uniformation process that turns them into simple chains. Mostly, the
non-human animal can may appear to us only if its predicates of specificity haven’t
been disposed of. This however is not in the anthropocentric precept whose priority
is the definitive separation of man from all other species, sanctioning the inexorable
10

J. Von Uexküll, Foray into the Worlds of Animals and Humans: With A Theory of Meaning,
University of Minnesota Press, 2010. The ethologist defines the Umwelt (world-environment) as
the set of the perceived world and the operational world of each animal species. He writes:
“everything a subject perceives belongs to its perception world (Merkwelt), and everything it
produces to its effect world (Wirkwelt). These two worlds, of perception and production of effects,
form one closed unite, the environment” p. 42.

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1 The Epimethan Condition

de-flow of predicates. The differentiation is therefore sought not in the content of
diversity of the predicate—the hoof of a horse, the fins of a dolphin or the wings of
a bat—but in the character of strict adaptive adherence of the predicate that the
non-human animal presents.
To bring out the dichotomy we must make the non-human animal can evanescent, rendering it a term that cannot be said in the singular,11 i.e. we must delete the
hoof, fins and wings and bring out the captivation that they produce—nature’s
inescapable rootedness in nomotethicity.12 So, without fins there’s no longer a
dolphin, without wings there’s no longer a bat, without hooves there’s no longer a
horse, but only the animal that is said in the singular—that can only be said in the
singular. That’s what emerges freeing itself from the appearance of adaptive form.
In this perspective, it becomes useless to get lost in the labyrinths of biodiversity,
searching for the condition in the declinative predicate because, for the animal said
in the singular, being a category is given by a condition that subsumes all predicates. The animal stripped of its connotations of heterospecificity—with respect to
biodiverse-world and not only to humans—has nothing to say to the human being
and does not deserve any attention since its dimensional character can be derived
negatively by the human. Thus we come to the answer that I have so often heard in
philosophical dissertations: namely, that it is not necessary to know the animals to
know what they are.
For this reason, making the peculiarity of human beings coincide with their
declinative13 specialization (i.e. their Umwelt) cannot render the specialness that
they claim to have, compared to non-humans. In fact, every animal is different and
unique in their declination of their Umwelt: a bearer of precise predicates of relation
and effectiveness with respect to the world. Thus, diversity should be sought in the
content of adherence: in the heaviness of the declinative predicate. Picture a scale:
to lower the animal’s plate we must make performative predicates heavier, while to
raise the human’s plate we must do the opposite and lighten functional predicates.
In the classical tradition recovered by humanists, the predicative difference in
animals is a gift from Epimetheus14: full participation in the world but also

For the concept of animal as “captivated entity” see the analysis of animality in Heidegger
offered by Giorgio Agamben (The Open. Man and Animal. Stanford University Press 2003). He
writes: “Heidegger seems here to oscillate between two opposite poles, which in some ways recall
the paradoxes of mystical knowledge—or, rather, nonknowledge. On the one hand, captivation is a
more spellbinding and intense openness than any kind of human knowledge; on the other, insofar
as it is not capable of disconcealing its own disinhibitor, it is closed in a total opacity. Animal
captivation and the openness of the world therefore seem related to one another as are negative and
positive theology, and their relationship is as ambiguous,” p. 59.
12
For “nomotethicity” see glossary.
13
For “predicate and declination of predicates” see glossary.
14
For “Epimetheus” see glossary.
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1.1 The Evanescence of Animality

7

radicalization within a specific dimension. This is what humanism rejects: the
definition of a circumscribed range that defines a specialty while limiting human
freedom.15
However, that “something special” that humanism attributes to mankind lies not
in adaptive plurality—it is not part of Epimetheus’ gift. On the contrary: it is
necessary that Epimetheus forgets about mankind, because the emptier the plate, the
higher the human goes. This is why the animal is so much present in philosophical
discourse on man while being evanescent and hard to pinpoint in the categorial
fading built to make the human emerge. The animal doesn’t show itself, it hides in a
forest of contrastive predications, hiding in fractalic oppositions and symbolic
inclusions. Thus, lost in this labyrinth of dichotomies, in the end we’re left with
nothing. The impression is that, getting rid of the non-human animal, we lose much
of the human too. So what is the definition of animal? That is, is there a definition of
animal or is it just an illusion?
The animal is what comes before man—the shared ancestral, the last drip of the
openness that would make us fully enjoy the world’s here-and-now again—or
perhaps it is what man never was: the unknown and unknowable, the polarity that
has to remain such. Which is true? Well, when we try to define the human we have
to resort to the predicative specification of the animal and this should lead us to
conclude that the animal—as the human’s opposite—has only a meaning if and
when it is introjected in the human. First there is only the non-human animal: that
is, the plural devoid of a categorial dimension. Thus, we need to understand what
has led to the slow erosion of the non-human animal in philosophical thought. We
might suppose that it was because of the human need to emerge compared to other
species. This, is turn, may depend on:
1. the mechanisms of identity construction that—due to an interpretative bias—
lead to emphasize the difference between man and other species, nullifying the
differences between the latter, in a way similar to the concept of “barbarian” in
the Hellenic world;
2. the a posteriori justification of animal exploitation that, especially after the
Neolithic period, mankind has carried out systematically by alienating many
heterospecifics from their habitat and lifestyle, turning them into brutes and
nullifying their specificity16;

15

If we follow humanist thought, from Pico della Mirandola (man as rank-less) to Martin
Heidegger (man as world-creator) we’ll see that the difference between man and animal lies not in
predicates, but in something prior to those. Man is simply not an animal and cannot be differentiated from non-humans by means of predicates.
16
Those belonging to a species other than Homo sapiens are not discriminated by virtue of an
ideology, but due to a historical and social structure of exploitation deriving from post-Neolithic
practices and, in particular, the process of domestication. There are still many positions with regard
to this debate. See the Italian philosopher Marco Maurizi, Al di là della natura. Gli animali, il
capitale e la libertà, Novalogos, Aprilia, 2012. See also the collection of essays edited by John
Sanbonmatsu,Critical Theory and Animal Liberation, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Maryland,
2010. Along the same post-Marxist line of thought see also D. NibertNibert, David, Animal

8

1 The Epimethan Condition

3. the consequence of the human appropriation of the non-human’s predicate, so
that animal epiphany (understood as seeing oneself in the heterospecific
dimension) starts a hermeneutic circle that can lead to the heterospecific’ loss of
predicates, which are taken over by the human.
While deeming the first two explanations plausible and probably mutually
exclusive, I believe the third to be the most relevant. When epiphany brings about a
therianthropic human being (that is, a human being changed through the dimensional hybridization that takes place in the encounter with the non-human) there is a
decentering for which the human can look at itself (by self-distancing) and go
beyond the dimension given to it by philogenesis.17 With animal epiphany the
human being encounters new existential dimensions beyond its own. This is the
ubermench that, imagining himself in a therianthropic way, experiences the bird’s
flight or the bull’s strength while perceiving a distance between his own identity
(magmatic and changing) and the animal’s (stable in its own predicates). It’s as if,
through epiphany, man took away the dimensional meaning from the
heterospecific’s predicates—in particular, he takes away the predicate’s ownership,
so that it becomes an endowment to be freely used by the human. In this way, the
predicates turn into strings moving the animal puppet. Losing its ownership, the
heterospecific’s predicate changes from endowment of animal subjectivity to
imperative or mechanism binding and de-subjectivizing the animal.
The animal, as the expression of a category, cannot be before the human nor, at
the same time, can it be like the human. In fact, the moment they meet, there is only
the spark of experiential subjectivity—wonder in its possible emotional or cognitive
declinations. In other words, there is the emergence of the Heideggerian phenomenon that qualifies the interlocutor as being as such. There is no doubt that, in
the passage between the objectification of the non-human animal and the subject’s
mirroring in the latter, the predicate is both emphasized and appropriated. When I
speak of seeing oneself in the non-human animal I mean to underline the main
character of the epiphany: it can lead one to wish to assume the non-human animal
dimension but also, vice versa, to differ even more from it. Therefore, epiphany
always produces an appropriation of heteromorphia18: one is led to transform it into
an anthropopoietic trace, introjecting it.
The animal—as that with which I need to confront myself—always comes after
and beyond the human, when the non-human animal transcends its status of
extraneity and, through a path of assimilative reference, is brought to being an
entity related to the human. Thus there has to be a moment of metamorphosis able
to turn the encounter into a relationship, where the heterospecific’ manifestation
goes beyond its phenomenic character, loosing its extraneity and becoming
(Footnote 16 continued)
Rights/Human Rights. Entanglements of Oppression and Liberation, Rowman & Littlefield
Publishers, Lanham, 2002.
17
For “philogenesis” see glossary.
18
For “heteromorphia” see glossary.

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